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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Manuel Javier Gomez asserted in his amended verified petition for post-conviction relief
that the district court in his underlying case had racial bias or prejudice against him, which
improperly influenced his sentence. He supported the racial bias issue with sworn affidavits
from himself and two of his family members, based on facts within their personal knowledge,
describing the conduct of the district court. However, after the district court disqualified itself
and the case was reassigned to a second district judge, the second judge determined that
Mr. Gomez had not presented any admissible evidence on the racial bias issue. The second
judge granted the State's summary dismissal motion on that issue.
Previously, the district court granted the State's summary dismissal motion on
Mr. Gomez's ineffective assistance of counsel issue that his trial counsel did not advise him on
the importance of being engaged in sex offender treatment before sentencing.

On appeal,

Mr. Gomez asserts the summary dismissals of the above two issues were in error.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Gomez has not shown that he
presented admissible evidence establishing a prima facie due process claim of judicial bias, and
that he has not shown that he presented admissible evidence establishing a prima facie claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-12.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to show that Mr. Gomez supported the racial bias issue
with admissible evidence, and the evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact on the district court's actual bias. Contrary to the State's arguments, the assertions in the
sworn affidavits supporting the racial bias issue were admissible evidence.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gomez's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the second district judge err in summarily dismissing the racial bias issue, because
Mr. Gomez supported the issue with admissible evidence, and the evidence was sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the district court's actual bias?

II.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel
issue that trial counsel did not advise Mr. Gomez on the importance of entering sex
offender treatment before sentencing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Second District Judge Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Racial Bias Issue, Because
Mr. Gomez Supported The Issue With Admissible Evidence, And The Evidence Was Sufficient
To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On The District Court's Actual Bias

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez asserts that the second district judge erred in summarily dismissing the racial

bias issue. Contrary to the second judge's determination, the assertions in the sworn affidavits
supporting the racial bias issue were admissible evidence, and the second judge had to consider
that admissible evidence in deciding whether to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal.
The evidence Mr. Gomez provided was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the district court had actual bias against him. Thus, the second judge erred in summarily
dismissing the racial bias issue.

B.

The Second District Judge Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Racial Bias Issue
Mr. Gomez supported the racial bias issue with admissible evidence, and the evidence

Mr. Gomez provided was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
district court had actual bias against him. Thus, the second district judge erred in summarily
dismissing the racial bias issue.

1.

Mr. Gomez Supported The Racial Bias Issue With Admissible Evidence

Mr. Gomez supported the racial bias issue with admissible evidence. Mr. Gomez, his
mother, Melanie Gomez, and his sister, Yolanda Flanik, made assertions concerning the district
court's racially biased conduct that were within their personal knowledge, and those assertions
were set forth in sworn affidavits.

(See R., pp.21-23, 49-52, 57-59.) Thus, contrary to the
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second district judge's determination, Mr. Gomez's assertions in support of the racial bias issue
were admissible evidence. See Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2008); Bias v. State, 159
Idaho 696, 704 (Ct. App. 2015); Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 712 (Ct. App. 2015). The
second judge had to consider that admissible evidence in deciding whether to grant the State's
motion for summary dismissal.
The State's arguments that Mr. Gomez did not present any admissible evidence that the
district court was racially biased against him suffer from the same infirmities as the second
district judge's erroneous determination. The State argues that allegations that the district court
made statements indicating racial bias were "clearly disproved by the record," and allegations
that the district court conveyed racial bias by facial expressions were "also properly rejected as
purely conclusory." (See Resp. Br., p.7.) However, the facts in the affidavits on the district
court's statements and facial expressions were substantiated by the personal knowledge of
Mr. Gomez, his mother, and his sister.

Thus, that evidence was admissible, because "[a]

petitioner's factual allegations that are based upon personal knowledge are admissible when
presented through a verified petition or a notarized affidavit." Bias, 159 Idaho at 704 (citing

Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155).
The State also argues, "The district court properly rejected [Mr.] Gomez and his family
member's entirely subjective and unverifiable speculation that racial animus was causing the trial
judge's alleged facial expressions." (Resp. Br., p.7.) However, the two cases cited by the State
in support of that argument actually undermine the State's position. For example, the State cites

Black v. State, 165 Idaho 100 (Ct. App. 2019), for the proposition that a "court [is] not required
to accept 'mere conclusory allegations."' (Resp. Br., p.7 (quoting Black, 165 Idaho at 104).)
But the full quote from Black is, "When considering summary dismissal, the district court must
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construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the
petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's
conclusions of law." Black, 165 Idaho at 104. Here, the assertions on the district court's facial
expressions are found within the affidavits Mr. Gomez submitted, which are based upon personal
knowledge and therefore constitute admissible evidence. See Bias, 159 Idaho at 704; Arellano,
158 Idaho at 712. Thus, Mr. Gomez's assertions that the district court exhibited racial bias
through facial expressions were not mere conclusory allegations.
The State also cites Adams v. State, 161 Idaho 485 (Ct. App. 2016), for the proposition
that "speculative allegations in affidavit[ s] need not be considered in summary dismissal
proceedings." (Resp. Br., pp.7-8 (citing Adams, 161 Idaho at 499).) However, the State did not
mention what kind of speculative allegations were at issue in Adams. The petitioner in Adams
asserted that the district court erred in summarily dismissing the claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and call two witnesses in his defense at trial. See Adams,
161 Idaho at 498. However, the petitioner only submitted an affidavit from his sister describing
what the first witness had told her, and attached a witness statement prepared for the police from
the second witness. See id. at 498-99. The petitioner did not provide an affidavit from either
witness. See id. at 499.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Adams noted, "It is not enough to allege that a witness
would have testified to certain events or would have rebutted certain statements made at trial
without providing, through affidavit, nonhearsay evidence of the substance of the witness's
testimony." Id. The Adams Court then held, "Adams's sister's affidavit alleging what another
witness may have testified to is hearsay and speculative and does not constitute admissible
evidence for purposes of summary dismissal." Id. Regarding the second witness, the Court held,
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"Adams only offered conclusory allegations as to what the second witness would have testified
to at trial based on a police report. Such argument is mere speculation and inadmissible." Id.
The Adams Court concluded, "Thus, Adams failed to provide admissible evidence concerning
the substance of either witness's testimony." Id. at 499-500.
Comparing Mr. Gomez's assertions on the district court's facial expressions with the
speculative allegations in Adams shows that the assertions here are not speculative.

The

assertions here are not based on hearsay or conclusory allegations on what someone would have
testified to at trial, but they are rather based on the personal knowledge of Mr. Gomez, his
mother, and his sister.

Again, because Mr. Gomez's assertions are found within the sworn

affidavits Mr. Gomez submitted, they are admissible evidence. See Bias, 159 Idaho at 704;
Arellano, 158 Idaho at 712. In sum, Black and Adams actually undermine the State's position.

The State next contends that Mr. Gomez "does not dispute the district court's
determination that the record of the underlying proceedings disproves some of the claims made
in the affidavits, namely allegations that the trial judge said anything racist, or in a manner that
conveyed any racism."

(Resp. Br., p.8.)

However, the second judge only made such a

determination after first erroneously determining that Mr. Gomez had not presented any
admissible evidence in support of the racial bias issue.

For example, the second judge

determined that, because there was no video recording of the proceedings, there was no actual
evidence to support Ms. Gomez's mother's assertion that the district court smirked or grinned, or
Mr. Gomez's assertion that the district court looked at him with "distain." (See R., p.105.) But
much like the second judge, the State neglects to invoke any legal authority defming "actual
evidence" to mean video recordings. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) Rather, the affidavits Mr. Gomez
submitted, based upon personal knowledge, are admissible evidence of the district court's
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statements and demeanor. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155; Bias, 159 Idaho at 704; Arellano, 158
Idaho at 712.
The second judge also gratuitously wrote that the assertion that the district court "was
racially biased due to the pronunciation of [Mr. Gomez's] first name on one occasion at the
beginning of some hearings is one of the most absurd propositions ever presented to this Court."
(See R., p.105.) The second judge appears to have determined there was no evidence of racial
bias regarding the district court's pronunciation of Mr. Gomez's name, because Mr. Gomez did
not correct the district court at the hearings or provide the proper pronunciation in the postconviction proceedings. (See R., pp. I 04-05.) Nonetheless, Mr. Gomez presented admissible
evidence, through his affidavits based upon personal knowledge, that the district court's
statements indicated a racial bias against him. (See R., pp.21, 50, 57-58.) Thus, the district court
improperly determined that Mr. Gomez had presented no admissible evidence in support of those
assertions, and the State's reliance on that improper determination is unavailing.
Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Gomez "ignores the district court's analysis that,
even accepting that the trial judge made all the facial expressions attributed to him, the allegation
that racism was the underlying reason for such expressions was unsupported by any evidence."
(Resp. Br., p.8.)

Once more, the affidavits Mr. Gomez submitted, based upon personal

knowledge, are admissible evidence of the district court's racial bias as evidenced by its facial
expressions. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155; Bias, 159 Idaho at 704; Arellano, 158 Idaho at 712.
A court must consider "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted," when deciding whether to grant
summary disposition. See I.C. § 19-4906(c). Mr. Gomez asserted through the affidavits that the
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district court's facial expressions showed racial bias, and the district court had to consider that
admissible evidence.
The State also argues, "Claims in affidavits that it did not appear to the affiant that the
district court listened to testimony or read documents is not evidence establishing that the district
court did not listen to testimony or read evidence, much less that the reason the district court did
not seem fully engaged was because of the defendant's race."

(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)

But

Mr. Gomez would not need to establish the district court's inattention or racial bias to survive
summary dismissal.

Rather, "Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's

evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor,
would entitle the applicant to the relief requested." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008).
"If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." Id. Pursuant to

that proper summary dismissal standard, Mr. Gomez presented admissible evidence that the
district court was inattentive, and that the district court's inattention stemmed from racial bias.
The State's adoption of the second judge's infirm determination also prompts the
question of how a post-conviction petitioner would raise a racial bias issue if assertions in sworn
affidavits, based on personal knowledge, were not admissible evidence.

Under the State's

argument, in the absence of brazen bigotry, petitioners would be effectively unable to make
actual bias due process claims that would survive summary dismissal. More subtle racism would
go unanswered, even though open racism and more hidden racial bias could each violate the due
process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997).
The assertions from the sworn affidavits supporting the racial bias issue were admissible
evidence, and the second district judge had to consider that admissible evidence in deciding
whether to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal. Thus, the second judge erred when
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he determined that Mr. Gomez had not provided any admissible evidence on the racial bias issue.
The State's arguments suffer from the same infirmities as the second judge's erroneous
determination, and this Court should reject them.

2.

The Evidence Was Sufficient To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To
Whether The District Court Had Actual Bias Against Mr. Gomez

The evidence Mr. Gomez provided was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the district court had actual bias against him. Mr. Gomez asserted that the district
court treated him and him alone with disgust and contempt during the hearings he observed,
when he was the only Hispanic/Latino defendant present for those proceedings. He also asserted
that he received a sentence longer than his prior history or similar cases would indicate he should
receive. Thus, Mr. Gomez made a prima facie case that the district court had an actual bias
against him, in violation of his due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal. See Bracy, 520
U.S. at 904-05. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "most matters relating to
judicial qualification do not rise to a constitutional level." See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009). However, Mr. Gomez submits that the particular facts of this

case indicate that the district court had "actual bias" against Mr. Gomez "of such nature and
character as would render it impossible that under the circumstances the party could have a fair
and impartial trial." See State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 460 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In its Respondent's Brief, the State has primarily focused on its argument that, "Because
there was no admissible evidence that the trial judge was in fact racially biased against
[Mr.] Gomez, or that the sentence he imposed was affected by racial prejudice, [Mr.] Gomez's
claim was properly dismissed." (See Resp. Br., pp.6, 8.) To the extent that the State also argues
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that the admissible evidence Mr. Gomez presented was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the district court had actual bias against him, Mr. Gomez has
addressed those arguments above. The evidence Mr. Gomez provided was sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the district court had actual bias against him.
Because the second judge erred in summarily dismissing the racial bias issue, the order
granting the State's summary dismissal motion on that issue should be reversed.

II.
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Issue
That Trial Counsel Did Not Advise Mr. Gomez On The Importance Of Entering Sex Offender
Treatment Before Sentencing
Mr. Gomez asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his ineffective
assistance of counsel issue that trial counsel did not advise Mr. Gomez on the importance of
entering sex offender treatment before sentencing.

The evidence Mr. Gomez provided was

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient, and as to whether that deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Gomez at sentencing.
The State argues that Mr. Gomez has not shown that he presented admissible evidence
establishing a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-12.)
The State's argument on this issue is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary. Thus,
Mr. Gomez would direct the Court's attention to pages 22-26 of the Appellant's Brief
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the second district judge's order granting
the State's motion for summary dismissal on the racial bias issue, and remand the issue for an
evidentiary hearing.

Mr. Gomez also respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district

court's order granting the State's motion for summary dismissal on the ineffective assistance of
counsel issue regarding treatment, and remand the issue for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 20th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of January, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BPM/eas
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